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Why is the Dialogue so Difficult between the
Historiography of the Social Sciences and the
Historiography of Science?
Summary
In this paper, I observe that the historiographies of the social sciences differ sensibly from
those of the sciences. I start by proposing a three-part typology of this specific develop-
ment and then look for the origin of these separate historiographies. I test three groups of
hypothesis: (a) the social sciences are so much different from the ‘hard sciences’ that it is
impossible to understand them using concepts and methods which have mostly been de-
veloped within the historiography of the ‘hard sciences’; (b) the second hypothesis assumes
that the object changes less than the look at it: hence, sharing their object, it suggests that
these historiographies differ because the identity and aims of the scholars who write them
differ; (c) it is neither the object nor the historiographers which differ, but their relation.
Keywords: Historiography of social sciences; historiography of science; discipline; presen-
tism; historicism; disciplinary function of history.
Im vorliegenden Aufsatz beobachte ich, dass sich die Geschichtsschreibung der Geistes-
und Sozialwissenschaten unterscheidet von jener der Naturwissenschaten und schlage ei-
ne dreifach gegliederte Typologie dieser spezifischen Entwicklung vor. Im Anschluss fra-
ge ich nach den Ursprüngen der genannten Ansätze und untersuche drei Hypothesen: a)
die Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaten unterscheiden sich so sehr von den ‚exakten‘ Wissen-
schaten, dass es unmöglich ist, sie mit Konzepten und Methoden verstehen zu wollen, die
aus der Geschichtsschreibung der Naturwissenschaten hervorgegangen sind. b) die Unter-
suchungsobjekte ändern sich weniger als die Betrachtungsweisen. Nicht unterschiedliche
Objekte sondern unterschiedliche Identitäten und Ziele der Historiker/innen bedingen al-
so die abweichenden Geschichtsschreibungen. c) Weder die Untersuchungsobjekte noch
die Historiker/innen in den beiden Bereichen differieren voneinander, sondern ihre je spe-
zifische Beziehung zueinander ist ausschlaggebend für die profunden Unterschiede.
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schichte.
The first paragraphs of Henrika Kuklick’s introduction to her edited volume A New His-
tory of Anthropology1 summarized several important problems of the contemporary his-
toriography of the social sciences2 and interestingly pointed out the specific path which
it is following:
This collection will appeal to a range of readers, anthropologists and historians
prominent amongst them. For historians, the value of its essays will be their
contextualization of anthropological ideas and practices in specific times and
places. Anthropologists will find not only discussions of the discipline’s major
branches but also analyses of portions of its history that rarely feature in its oral
tradition […]. The classic typology of historians of the human sciences is Stock-
ing’s, a dichotomous scheme of ideal types: “presentists” and “historicists”. Pre-
sentists […] frame their accounts in contemporary terms, oten seeking lessons
from the past for the present: their tone may be celebratory, as they trace an-
tecedents of ideas and methods now considered commendable, or mournful,
regretting the loss of exemplary practices. Historicists […] are not explicitly
concerned with contemporary standards and debates: they show that when we
read old texts as if they had just been written, we frequently misunderstand
their authors’ intended meanings.3
For obvious reasons, the curious tone of these few introductory sentences strikes every
scholar aware of the innovations which have revolutionized the history of science in
the last thirty years. First, Kuklick stretches the value of ‘contextualization’ as if it was a
1 Kuklick 2008.
2 Interestingly, the English language offers no unan-
imously accepted word to designate the various
disciplines which are united in the French sciences
humaines or the German Geisteswissenschaten. As a
matter of fact, in English, these disciplines are dis-
tributed in four, partly overlapping, categories: the
social sciences, which comprise anthropology, soci-
ology, archaeology, history, geography, linguistics,
economics and psychology; the behavioral sciences,
which are composed of psychology, anthropology,
and the cognitive sciences; the humanities which
consist of art, literature, history, linguistics and an-
thropology; the human sciences, which gather the
cultural study of the human being (archaeology, an-
thropology, …) and the biological (medicine, phys-
ical anthropology). Hence most of the disciplines
appear simultaneously in different categories, a fact
which underlines the imprecision of the division: it
is a convention, as Roger Smith puts it (Smith 1997;
4, 17; see also Smith 1999, Reubi to be published).
Put shortly, the word is missing, and so, probably,
does the concept – which may be, in part, an expla-
nation for its curious historiography. In this paper,
following Porter and Ross 2003 and against Kuck-
lick, I will use the category “social sciences”.
3 Kuklick 2008, 1.
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new concept, yet, when her volume was published, David Bloor’s principle of causality4
had already been recognized, and questioned, for more than three decades. Second, she
does not name Bloor’s concept, even though it is most improbable that she is unaware
of it, but rather uses the less specific word ‘contextualization’. Last, she indicates that the
question of contextualization constitutes a ‘classic’ problem for the historiography of
the social sciences which has been identified by George Stocking who labelled the two
possible postures of the historian of social sciences, presentism and historicism. Thus, in
short, Kuklick’s introduction does not only show that the historiography of the social
sciences uses different concepts than the other historians of sciences; it also indicates
that it does not fall within the scope of the chronology of what could be labelled the
general historiography of science5 and, nevertheless, tackles the same questions. Hence,
this example addresses the questionwhether all sciences are objects of equivalent interest
for the history of science. I will argue that it is not the case, and in particular that the
social sciences are given a specific place in the historiography and that their histories
differ sensibly from the ones of the hard sciences. This is not a problem, of course; the
problem is rather that the historians act as if the social sciences were studied like the
hard sciences’ disciplines, while, in practice, they are not.
Hence this paper will slightly broaden the scope of the “new historiographical ap-
proaches to archaeology”6 and apply the question to the case of the other social sciences.
As Kuklick’s example shows, the limits of the historiography of archaeology, which
Gisela Eberhardt and Fabian Link have pointed out, can indeed be observed in the his-
tory of anthropology, but also in the history of history, linguistics, or sociology. In most
of these fields, as Raymond Boudon has shown,7 it can be seen that the historiographies
do not match the historiography of the hard sciences. The authors who have decisively
contributed to the general field of the history of science, from David Bloor8 to Barry
Barnes and Steve Shapin9, and from Pierre Bourdieu10 to Bruno Latour11, are barely
referred to; the questions which they raise, the methods which they use, and perspec-
tives which they follow are mostly different, and, when similar, their origins are not
mentioned.
The aim of this paper is to identify the reasons for this specific path. To do so, I
propose to identify the types of historiography which historians of the social sciences
write and observe that they differ strongly from hard science’s historiography. Secondly,
4 Bloor 1976.
5 The general historiography of science consists of the
study of natural, physical, and medical sciences. It is
hence limited to what English names “science” and
what French describe as sciences dures. In this paper,
to mention this limited segment of historiography, I
will use the formula: history of hard sciences.
6 The workshop during which the first version of this
paper presented in September 2010 in Berlin was
named: “New Historiographical Approaches to Ar-
chaeological Research”.
7 Boudon 1992, 304.
8 Bloor 1976.
9 Barnes and Shapin 1979.
10 Bourdieu 1984.
11 Latour 1984; Latour 1989.
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I will submit for discussion three hypotheses which may explain the reasons for the
mutual distrust by the historians of ‘general science’ and the historians of the social
sciences in both the tools developed and the results obtained. Finally, I will suggest that,
since it was a historical process which gave this orientation to the historiography of the
social sciences, there are possibilities to end this mutual distrust.
1 The historiography of the social sciences – an attempted
typology
Over the past 40 years, the historiography of the social sciences has produced an incred-
ible volume of work which presents so many national, institutional, or epistemological
varieties that it is merely impossible to keep the overview. And even if it was possible,
the few pages of this modest contribution would not suffice to describe these in any sat-
isfying way. However a quick glance at a representative selection of publications on this
topic may suggest dividing them into three broad and partly overlapping categories:12
philosophical, disciplinary, and historicist historiography.
1.1 Philosophical history
The studies within the scope of the philosophical approach present three characteris-
tics. In the first place, they are normative studies of a discipline, in the sense that Gas-
ton Bachelard intended when he asserted that “en opposition complète aux prescriptions qui
recommandent à l’historien de ne pas juger, il faut au contraire demander à l’historien des sciences
des jugements de valeur.”13 These studies analyze a discipline’s past in order to help schol-
ars to improve their practice of the discipline. Secondly, these studies ground almost
solely on published texts and are therefore limited to a history of published ideas. They
neither consider the history of scientific practice nor question the financing problems in
science, which is considered a purely cognitive activity. Lastly, they focus on one specific
discipline. To be sure, a few cross-disciplinary studies have been attempted, among them,
Georges Gusdorf’s De l’histoire des sciences à l’histoire de la pensée14 and Michel Foucault’s
Les mots et les choses.15 As the first general studies of the social sciences, they were crucial
since they contributed to validate these activities as legitimate objects of the philosophy
12 It is important to underline that this typology is by
no means a chronology. As Blondiaux and Richard
have shown, the historicist turn in the history of the
social sciences does not occur synchronically in the
different disciplines (Blondiaux and Richard 1999,
120–121), nor does it have an absolute character
(Blondiaux and Richard 1999, 116).
13 Bachelard 1972, 141.
14 Gusdorf 1966.
15 Foucault 1966.
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of science and emancipated them from the domination of the practitioners’ historiogra-
phy. Moreover, they shaped later studies by attempting to understand the social sciences
through the study of their past, thus redefining the past as a key to the essence of science.
Finally, they attempted to identify the nature of the matter unifying the social sciences.
Although they shared very different views (anti-humanist vs. humanist), followed differ-
ent processes (unconscious vs. conscious), and had different perspectives (discontinuity
vs. continuity), they tried in their more or less accurate studies of the history of the so-
cial sciences, to identify the processes, changes and continuities which have led to the
birth of the social sciences and, with more ambition, to understand what has been their
conception of the human being.
What is more interesting for this paper, however, is the development of this nor-
mative philosophy within each of the individual social sciences, all of which share this
type of literature. In the history of archaeology, studies like Laurent Olivier’s Le sombre
abîme du temps16 correspond to this. Archaeology, he argues, shouldn’t try to put to-
gether again the events of the past but must understand the modes of memory processes
through materiality. In the history of history, Michel De Certeau’s L’écriture de l’histoire17
or Paul Veyne’s Comment on écrit l’histoire18 also fit into this first category, identifying
the essential characteristics of historiography and the problems arising from the use of
specific tools or concepts. James Clifford and George Markus’sWriting Culture19 tackled
the same questions for anthropology. The majority of these texts indeed make use of the
history of these various disciplines to identify their current problems and to discover
their essence by studying its past. Hence, although these studies may present significant
methodological propositions, they differ sensibly from the historians’ or the practition-
ers’ positions: essentialist and anachronical, their analyses are more valuable to the prac-
titioners because they are bonnes à penser. Interesting for their reflexive perspective, the
philosophical essays may hence present a normative dimension.
1.2 Disciplinary history
This normative dimension is a characteristic which is again found in the second, disci-
plinary approach. In contrast to the philosophical approach’s consideration of processes,
however, this historiography focuses on analyzing what falls within the scope of a dis-
cipline and what is of interest for their practitioners today. As Bruno Latour puts it,
they study the “stabilized state of affairs”, rather than the “affair being stabilized”20 –
or in Bourdieu’s words, they are concerned by the opus operatum, rather than the modus
operandi.21 Identifying the discipline-in-the-past to the discipline-in-the-present, these
16 Olivier 2008.
17 Certeau 1975.
18 Veyne 1971.
19 Clifford and Marcus 1986.
20 Latour 2005, 1.
21 Bourdieu 1997, 86.
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historians assume that there are things such as anthropology or archaeology, and do not
try to understand the processes which have created them. Hence, they reify and natural-
ize the various fields of research.
Moreover, a disciplinary historiography is also a historiography which disciplines.
Judith Schlanger22 and Claude Blanckaert23 have shown that the writing of a history
is generally a constitutive (and last) step in the formation of a discipline. The quest for
“epistemic heroes”24 and “forgotten precursors”25 falls within its scope. While this is
globally true, it is a particularly important process in the social sciences in the context
of the reflexive turn. In the historiography of anthropology, for example, the reflexive
move of the 1970s which resulted from a profound legitimacy crisis influenced many
works. Hence, chronology has worked here as a mise en ordre of the disciplinary land-
scape. As exemplified in Raymond Aron’s Etapes de la pensée sociologique,26 history is a
pretext to clear discussions about the contemporary state and the future of a discipline
and Jean Jamin could explicitly link both issues: “l’ethnologie est entrée dans une phase de
remaniement, qui passe peut-être par une réévaluation de son histoire”.27 Thus, written by lead-
ing scholars of the field, disciplinary history aims at the reproduction of the relations
among the actors of the field and perpetuates the state of the discipline. Alternatively, it
may be written by ambitious newcomers who use history to redefine the doxa and the
limits of the field.28 In both cases, history is used to discipline the discipline and this
is why this historiography usually appears in the introduction of popular disciplinary
handbooks. As a consequence, numerous publications written by practitioners follow
this path29 and dominate this historiography.30
These disciplinary histories mostly follow what George Stocking (and Kucklick,
ater him) has named a presentist view of a discipline’s history. This view, Stocking has
argued, is the position where the historian tends to demand of the past something more
than simply why, where, and how something has happened. The past must be related
to, and even useful for, furthering his professional activities in the ongoing present. It
has a normative commitment, like Butterfield’s whig interpretation of history,31 and
wrenches the individual historical phenomenon from the complex network of its con-
temporary context in order to see it in abstracted relationship to analogues in the present.
While it is worth noting that this distinction echoes, but never explicitly refers to, the
broader and famous controversy of the 1950’s between Gaston Bachelard and Alexan-
dre Koyré, Stocking asserts that it is of particular importance to the historiography of
the behavioral sciences. If this is so, the explanation should be found, in his view, in
22 J. Schlanger 1992.
23 Blanckaert 1995.
24 Bourdieu 1984, 34.
25 Kaeser 2001, 202.
26 Aron 1967.
27 Jamin 1988, 474; see also: Lepenies and Weingart
1983, XVII.
28 Bourdieu 2001, 72–77.
29 Kuper 1975; Daniel and Renfrew 1962; Daniel 1981.
30 Blondiaux and Richard 1999, 116.
31 Butterfield 1931.
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the fact that social sciences are, in Kuhn’s words, mostly pre-paradigmatic32; hence, this
historiography is more likely to be open to certain vices of presentism than the general
historiography of science: “When there is no single frameworkwhich unites all thework-
ers in the field, but rather competing schools, historiography simply extends the arena
of their competition”.33 It means that the history of the social sciences is consubstantial
to their practice.34 Adapting Clausewitz’s dictum, one might say that historiography is
merely a controversy pursued by other means.
1.3 Historicist history
The historicist approach constitutes the origin of the last type of social-sciences histori-
ography, which, like Kuklick’s volume, aims at contextualizing the production of knowl-
edge. Noël Coye’s analysis of archaeological practice,35 Nathan Schlanger’s studies of the
relations between nation-building and science36 or Marc-Antoine Kaeser’s biography of
Edouard Desor37 are some publications of the historiography of archaeology which fit
this category; BertrandMueller’s use of Lucien Febvre’s book reviews towrite the French
founder of the Annales’ biography38 or Claude Blanckaert’s study of the relations be-
tween anthropology and politics39 are their counterparts for history or anthropology.
Thus, these historians of the social sciences adopt various questions and methods from
the general historiography of science. However, although one may find for obvious rea-
sons numerous exceptions in the historiography of psychology and of governance,40
rarely do they affiliate themselves to the different trends of the historiography of sci-
ence which invented them, and seldom do they acknowledge their debts – they content
themselves with the claim of being historicists. They adopt a contextualist view; analyze
practices; study unpublishedmaterial which is not a priori a scientific archive; follow the
relationships between and among the public, policymakers, and the sciences; examine
controversies and relate context to science; or seek to understand the processes by which
these disciplines were constituted. However, they barely mention the research in other
fields, specifically in the history of hard sciences, and do not use their results. In other
words, studying similar objects using a similar perspective is not a sign for sharing a
disciplinary field. They do not refer to each other, and publish in different journals, as
one may observe from the case of the historiography of anthropology or archaeology.
Historians of the social sciences indeed have their own journals and some disciplines
even have their own publication or series (History of Anthropology, Bulletin of the History
32 Kuhn 1962, 15.
33 Stocking 1968, 8.
34 Matalon 1992, 9.
35 Coye 1997.
36 N. Schlanger 2002.
37 Kaeser 2004.
38 Müller 2003.
39 Blanckaert 2001b.
40 See for example: Danziger 1990; Morawski 2005;
Carson 2006; Rose 1996.
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of Archaeology), or readers.41 Moreover, historians of the social sciences are organized in
specific societies (ESHHS), and are present at separate conferences. To put it clearly: they
belong to a distinct discipline.
Broadly, the situation already described by Friedrich Engels42 is thus the following:
Research in the history of social sciences fits into a normative history of ideas, with a
philosophical and a disciplinary pole, and neglects the recent developments in the his-
toriography of science. Another group of historians of the social sciences shares topics,
methods, and perspectives with the vastmajority of historians of science, but clearly con-
stitutes a different community of research. As Theodore Porter and Dorothy Ross have
put it, “actors in this field […] have not always been aware of one another, and some
perhaps have discovered only recently that all along they have been writing this species
of prose”.43 At the end of the day, these three types of historiography of the social sci-
ences share features that differ significantly from those in the general historiography of
science; these common differences (might) explain why historians of the social and the
natural sciences do not explicitly share their historiographicalmethods and perspectives;
they most probably explain why one may talk about “new approaches” for innovations
of more than thirty years.
2 The origins of separate communities
Nevertheless, it is interesting to understand why and how this situation occurred. Of
course, no simple answer is available here and various paths of explanation should be
explored. In my view, three hypotheses might be pursued, which I wish to offer for dis-
cussion. The first hypothesis suggests that the objects of these two disciplines are merely
too different to be examined in the same way. The second tracks the identity and aims
of the scholars who write these different historiographies and wonders if the difference
originates here. The third supposes that the origin of these two different conceptions of
the historiography of science lies in the relation between the objects and the observers
or, in other words, between and among the knowledge-in-the-past, the knowledge-in-
the-present and the observer.
2.1 Objects
The first proposition is that the objects observed in the social sciences and in the hard
sciences are too different for their historiographers to share disciplinary elements. There-
fore, so this proposition, they use different concepts and publish in different journals.
41 Murray and Evans 2008.
42 Boudon 1992, 303.
43 Porter and Ross 2003, 9.
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Chemists, ater all, study molecules, while theologians study sacred texts, and this is
why they use different tools, follow different aims, and publish in different journals.
The most important series on the topic such as the Cambridge and the Norton History
of Science series follow this pattern too and have published special volumes dedicated
to the social sciences. The hypothesis is hence that concepts and methods in the history
of science were developed within the study of a specific object, the hard sciences, and
they cannot be used in another domain. To be sure, this is far from being a new hypoth-
esis. WilhelmDilthey already proposed a similar position44 and Charles Perry Snow had
argued that the humanities and the natural sciences were parts of two different, incom-
mensurable cultures.45 More recently, Wolf Lepenies’s view was still very much alike
when he suggested in Die drei Kulturen that the history of sociology should be analyzed
with the tools of literary analysis, rather than of the history of science, because it was
more of an aesthetic than a cognitive activity.46 Thus he agreed with Raymond Boudon
who argued that the social sciences followed four different goals – cognitive, aesthetic,
critic, and cameralist – which explained their greater diversity. Quite in opposition to
the hard sciences which, he suggested, were only cognitive, the cameralist social sciences
could not favor the accumulation of knowledge since they necessarily constituted a situ-
ated knowledge. This, according to Boudon, explains the need for history in the social
sciences.47
This hypothesis is tempting48 – although the idea following which the hard sciences
would not be situated knowledge seems quite outdated – because it can help to under-
stand why methods and concepts in the history of social science have developed in a
specific way, and in a particular chronology. Since the object differs, the relevant ques-
tions and the legitimate controversies are not necessarily the same and, if they are, they
do not have to follow the same chronology. This hypothesis is also appealing because
it calls into question the hard sciences’ imperialism,49 which lits these disciplines to
a scientific benchmark; transposed to historiography, it would assert that the methods
which allow historians to study the past of these sciences must work to understand the
history of other sciences.50 It is eventually an intriguing hypothesis, because it finds an
echo in the very proposal of the STS which asserts that places play a role in the consti-
tution of science.51 Thus, the essential differences between the social and other sciences
would be rooted in the various loci in which they are practiced.
However, this hypothesis is problematic: The idea that the social sciences and hard
sciences are so different is, as I have already pointed out, an old serpent de mer. From
44 Dilthey 1883.
45 Snow 1959.
46 Lepenies 1985. – Jerome Kagan recently pursued the
same argument and suggested that there were three
incommensurable cultures: the social sciences, the
humanities and the natural sciences (Kagan 2009).
47 Boudon 1992, 306–311.
48 See also Smith 1997, 13–19.
49 Matalon 1992, 9.
50 Porter and Ross 2003, 6.
51 Livingstone 2003.
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Dilthey’s Verstehen and Erklären to Kuhn’s pre-paradigmatic science, concepts have been
proposed by many scholars to explain this putative difference without any of them
ever standing out. This is not entirely surprising, for the distinction, in many respects,
does not appear to be meaningful. The study of scientific practices, rather than ideas,
or essences, has thus allowed one to construct communities of knowledge which are
transversal to the social sciences – hard sciences border, as Robert E. Kohler has con-
vincingly shown with the category of collecting sciences, uniting archaeology, zool-
ogy, ethnography or botanic52 or as Ian Hacking has done with interactive and non-
interactive kinds.53
Aside from these transversal categories, the social sciences and hard sciences present
more similarities than it has previously been thought. AsClaude Blanckaert has shown,54
the relations between science and society as well as the processes of emergence are iden-
tical in both the social and hard sciences. While he admits that these are less visible in
the social sciences, he suggests searching for the origin of this phenomenon not in some
undefined, essential difference, but rather in the fact that the social sciences are less of
an issue than themore strategic, expensive hard sciences. They are indeed quite identical
and, if something is of interest here, it might be to identify the origin of this distinction
and what is at stake in this historical, but naturalized difference.55 Hence, the validity
of the category has to be questioned and, although it is certain that what is understood
today as social sciences does not overlap what was understood 100 years ago, it is still
unknown, as Porter and Ross have underlined,56 if what is branded and united under
the label ‘social sciences’ shares enough features in synchrony.
2.2 Observers
The second hypothesis turns away from the object and focuses on the identity of the
historians of science and social sciences. It is known that before the late 1970s, the vast
majority of historians of science were either philosophers or practitioners of their own
discipline. This is true for the hard sciences, as Thomas Kuhn, David Bloor or Alexandre
Koyré testify, while the examples of Robert Lowie, RaymondAron orColinRenfrew and
Glyn Daniel show that the same goes for the social sciences.
However, from the 1970s on, a community of scholars has emerged in the study
of hard sciences who are neither philosophers nor practitioners. Inventing a tradition
which goes back to Karl Mannheim, Max Scheler or Ludwig Fleck, they proposed an
objectifying and distant look at the sciences of the past, which quickly dominated the
field. Many of these studies of science have been identified as a reaction to the realm
52 Kohler 2007.
53 Hacking 1999.
54 Blanckaert 2001a, 15.
55 Smith 1997, 7.
56 Porter and Ross 2003, 1.
232
why is the dialogue so difficult
of big science in the 1950s and 1960s. The critical posture towards the Cold War and
eurocentrism contributed to an ideological position opposed to science, rationality and
progress and led to a general critique of power and knowledge. In this process, the hard
sciences have been analyzed and criticized from the outside as being part of the con-
demnedmilitary-industrial, capitalistic complex and, as Dominique Pestre has argued,57
the aim of these studies was to de-essentialize and to demystify science, among others
by showing its diversity, its contingency and its practices.
For the social sciences, the movement was both similar and different. A critical view
in anthropology or in history appeared in the 1970s (e. g., Paul Veyne,Michel deCerteau,
or James Clifford), whichwas rooted in the same phenomenon found in the general field
of science: Anthropology’s relationship to the colonial power or to the military (Project
Camelot), or history’s reification of past traditions to invent national, or local, or reli-
gious identities, showed significant similarities to the other sciences. However, contrary
to the hard sciences’ case and although there are some rare exceptions,58 the criticalmove
came from within. While this is quite understandable for history at least, it nevertheless
constituted a decisive difference with numerous and important consequences.
Three of them should be pinpointed. Firstly, the insider’s view favors a presentist
perspective. This is of importance, because the social-science historians’ critical view is
not solely rooted in the anti-science movement, but also in the reflexive turn. In this
context, history is not simply a way to criticize science, but also a path to better, and
renew the orientations of the single disciplines. Hence, the presentist perspective reifies
the discipline, and promotes the actual state of the discipline to a benchmark. They look
for operating ancestors, take the discipline for granted, and rarely question its coming
into being. Secondly, the internal critique is not weaker, but may be less conflictual. It is
not a war between sociologists and scientists; it is rather a discussion among practition-
ers of a same discipline about the state of an art whose axioms are shared. Because of
that, the fronts stiffen less and a dialogue in which everyone has the same competences
appears. Lastly, the histories which they write are locally competent, i. e. at the scale of
a single discipline and nation. Thus, an historian of anthropology will rarely mention,
nor be concerned with, the naturalist perspectives of his objects of study, because today’s
anthropologists do not master these issues; similarly, they also will not be able to pro-
duce transdisciplinary studies, because it is not of any interest for the discipline, despite
what such studies can bring, as Peter Galison has demonstrated59. This limited field of
competence also hinders their joining the community of the historians of science and
they remain identified as archaeologists, anthropologists, or linguists. In other words,
they are amateur historians.60
57 Pestre 2006, 6.
58 Porter and Ross 2003, 8.
59 Galison 1996.
60 Blanckaert 1988, 451–452.
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Institutionally, this has important consequences: as amateurs, they develop their
networks in their own professional and disciplinary fields, that of archaeology, anthro-
pology, or geography, and this explains their publishing in specific journals; as ama-
teurs, they are also financed by institutions of their own field, which, of course, favor
research in their field. Thus, this volume is limited to the history of archaeology, as was
the workshop and while the scope could have broaden to epigraphy or papyrology, it
would most probably not have been to that of geography or psychology; the scholars’
publishing strategies finally proceed from these links to one specific discipline and they
do not indicate a social science’s historians strong wish to talk to historians of science.
Hence, in spite of the quantitative importance of the social and social sciences in the
contemporary university and in spite of the social scientist’s interest in their own his-
tory, this historiography finds little echo among the historians of science and remains
of little interest.
However, this hypothesis isn’t entirely satisfying either because it appears that is not
so much the identity of these scholars – both the historians of science and the historians
of social sciences are social scientists, what delegitimizes the difference between amateur
and professionals61 – which is at stake, but rather the question of their relationship to
their object. Some study themselves or their own tradition, others study external objects.
The position is different. This leads to the last hypothesis.
2.3 Relationships
The last hypothesis supposes that the important difference lies neither in the object, nor
in the historian, but in their relationship. We observed this earlier in what I called the
disciplinary function of historiography, which arises from a new type of relationship be-
tween observer and object. Since Henri-Irénée Marrou,62 social scientists and historians
have been aware of the ambiguous connections between historiography and the histo-
rian. His famous “l’histoire est inséparable de l’historien” stressed the impact of the scholar’s
present, social and cultural references andWeltanschauung on his scientific work. The is-
sue for the historiography of the social sciences, if similar, is slightlymore complex. As in
Marrou’s case, the construction of the past is mediated through the historian’s present.
But the present comprises a conception of the present discipline itself. Therefore, history,
or the discipline-in-the-past, is shaped by the discipline-in-the-present. Simultaneously,
the discipline-in-the-present is of course historically determined, which means that the
discipline-in-the-past shapes also the discipline-in-the-present. This double relation is
important for the historiography of the social sciences since it links the discipline-in-
the-past and the discipline-in-the-present through the mediation of the historian. And
61 Blondiaux and Richard 1999, 115. 62 Marrou 1954, 47.
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it is all the more so when the historian is a historian-cum-practitioner-of-the-discipline
as it is so oten the case for the historiography of the social sciences. Hence, it offers the
possibility that the historian uses the past to build the discipline in the way he wishes it
as a practitioner of the discipline whose history he is writing. Thus the relationships be-
tween object and scholar are multiplied, because the historian relates both to the object
in the past and the object in the present.
The historiography of the social sciences is therefore much less autonomous than
the general historiography of science. The past is at stake, for the discipline in the present
and for its historiography which is in return a weapon to control the present and the
past. This explains why it is considered a sphere with a high value coefficient, and this
is why it has been generally dominated by the big names of the field. It comes with
important symbolic capital within the disciplinary fields and constitutes a major issue.
For this reason, and for the motives proposed by Boudon63 as well as in stark contrast to
the historiography of other sciences, disciplinary histories are central for the education
of the students in the social sciences. Historiography is a means to reproduce or change,
and in any case direct, the future of the discipline.
This is significant for the argument. The development of a new historiography and
sociology of general science indeed brings new actors into the field of the historiography
of sciences. Moreover, these actors are quite powerful ones. Their professionalship, their
external view, and the growing place of science studies in the academic world give them
major symbolic capital and thus menace the field of the historiography of sciences and
for those dominating this historiography. As I have argued, the threat is even greater in
the case of the historiography of the social sciences, since mastering the past helps to
shape the discipline’s present. If in the case of the hard sciences, the intrusion of these
new methods has transformed the field of the history of science with some violence,
in the history of social sciences both history and the discipline itself are at stake. The
issue is hence much more critical for the dominants who may lose on both counts.
Their position as historians dictates their position as archaeologists, anthropologists, or
geographers. Therefore, the reluctance of the historians of the social sciences to the new
developments of historiography is bigger.
At the same time, one might think that the historians and sociologists of science
would invest the history of the social science and make it their territory. But they do
not and do not show more interest in the object “social science” than the historians of
social sciences for the new tools. This is true for several reasons: First, the social sciences
are of little importance in the scientific field. They are thought to spend less money, do
not develop in the big science, and seem of little ideological or political use. They don’t
develop in big institutions, which are studied in the frame of the sociology of scientific
63 Boudon 1992, 306–311.
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organizations. They are also insignificant in the social field, since they do not raise fun-
damental questions as the genetically modified organism, or the global management of
the swine flu. Moreover, the social sciences have strongly criticized their own practices
and principles in thewake of the reflexive turn; thus the desacralization of science, which
was an important aim of the Science Studies, is not an issue any more. In addition, the
hard science’s imperialism mentioned above lets one believe that the social sciences are
like any other science, and hence that there is no interest in studying their specific case.
Finally, most leading names in the history of science have studied the hard sciences, and
both the institutions’ force of inertia and the laws of imitation maintained them for
long in the core of interest.
Thus, this relational issue between the past, the present, and the viewer may ex-
plain the state of the historiography of the social sciences. On one hand, the distrust
towards new historiographic trends is a reassuring posture for disciplinary historians:
Rejecting these methods, concepts, and results delays the arrival of new actors and the
transformation of the discipline. On the other hand, the historicist historians have been
entangled in an isolated field designed by the presentist historians and neglected by the
historians of science and have developed their own concepts and methods. Sometimes
similar to those of the other historians, sometimes different, they only rarely mention
their affiliation, if any. They only raise the flag of historicism as if it was sufficient to
identify them. As a matter of fact, historicist historians of the social sciences, satisfied
and obsessed by the founding separation of presentism underlined by Kuklick,64 but
insufficiently examined and certainly less significant than it is generally assumed,65 may
have neglected another dividing wall which isolated their historical object and its histo-
rians from the general history of science. Hence they must act now, so that they do not
become the new presentists of the historians of science, ater winning the battle against
presentism – which would thus consolidate a seducing but uncompletable comparison
in the context of this paper with the nineteenth century historicists who won the battle
against romantic historians before losing against the nomothetic historians influenced
by sociology.
3 Conclusion
I have argued that the historiography of the social sciences follows a specific path. Con-
sidering the hypotheses suggested above, I would like to offer some modest solutions
to change the situation. First, historians of general science and historians of the social
sciences study the same object. Thus, there should be no objection to sharing methods
64 Kuklick 2008, 1. 65 Blondiaux and Richard 1999, 110–112.
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and concepts. Second, the identity of the scholars is not an issue; what matters is their
relationship to the objects. Hence, historians of social sciences need to rid themselves
of their disciplinary perspective rather than excluding other historians. Not only should
they abandon studies which focus on one single discipline, but they must eliminate the
presentist perspective. To achieve this, a possible path would be to open up their field
and invite historians of science to consider their topics in order to re-shape the field
dominated by the presentist views. The issue here is to abandon the “ghetto mental-
ity”66 which dominates the field and become professional. In this respect, it is of central
importance to reject the idea that the history of archaeology or the history of anthropol-
ogy are merely dynamic subfields of archaeology or anthropology.67 In addition, they
should, fully use and recognize the heuristic capacities of new historiographical trends.
Nevertheless, this should not be an unconditional surrender. Historians of the social
sciences should make use of their specific case studies, no longer with the aim of de-
veloping parallel concepts and methods, but to participate in the elaboration and the
modification of the history of science’s general concepts through their own results. Even-
tually, they must claim the value of their own concepts, such as the presentist-historicist
distinction and all the critical thought born in the reflexive turn, to promote them as
useful concepts in the general field of science.
In this respect, if I may express myself in military terms, these solutions address the
question of the strategic relevance of a workshop on “New historiographical approaches
to archaeological research”, which constituted the starting point of this publication. First,
the adjective “new” has to be questioned. What is our posture, if we assert that these
thirty years old methods and trends are new, since we all know they are not? It puts us in
an outsider position. Furthermore, it is limited to archaeology,most probably because of
some institutional motives which have been indicated earlier. Hence it perpetuates the,
incorrect, idea following which history of archaeology would be apart from the history
of sciences. The tactical relevance of this is perfectly clear, since we are still, obviously,
cornered in an uncomfortable situation with disciplinary historians who are dominant
in our discipline pushing us on one side, and advocates of the STS-field, which are dom-
inant in the social sciences’ field, pulling us on the other. However, strategically and
quite to the contrary to Blondiaux and Richard’s proposition, it is crucial to take root in
the field of the history of science rather than turn back to the disciplines again.68 To do
so, it may be interesting, ater harvesting the results of the mentioned workshop, to go
two steps further: First, another workshop might be organized, which would overstep
the disciplinary boundaries, and address these issues again at the general level of the
social sciences; second, ater having assessed our achievements, we should confront the
general historiographies of science, to understand what our specialization in the science
66 Collini 1988, 398.
67 Handler 2000, 3.
68 Blondiaux and Richard 1999, 123.
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studies’ field can bring to the whole field. Here we shall question whether and how the
tools developed in the STS work (or not) with our object and try to contribute to their
improvement or the invention of new tools. And, in this process, archaeology, standing
at the interface between the natural and social sciences, will again, but for other reasons,
have to be in the middle of the interest.
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